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ABSTRACT: This paper describes a model of the human decision-making process in maritime interdiction tactical 
operation using conceptual blending theory (CBT) and software blending mechanism. CBT explains how humans 
think using blending operations on mental spaces. This paper uses CBT to model Boyd’s Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Act Loop Theory, a mental process used by military commanders to make decisions. The software blending 
mechanism is implemented using the Naval Postgraduate School’s first-generation Software Blending library. 
Military expert’s experiences were captured using a similar strategy implemented in the threat assessment model 
created by Liebhaber and Feher. Probability Estimates of Event (PEoE) is used to represent the significant of each 
possible tactic used by potential threats. Several PEoE are used to represent the mental patterns for recognizing a 
threat situation. Finally, decisions are derived using linear assignment, an optimality approach that considers threat 
attack probability, goals and interdiction resource effectiveness. The model was tested in a simulated maritime threat 
environment in order to evaluate its ability to coordinate interdictions by patrol crafts. These test results were 




The management of a busy shipping port such as the 
one in Singapore [1] is usually complicated by 
occurrences of piracy [2] and possible maritime 
terrorist attacks [3]. Sensors such as radars are usually 
used to monitor the shipping traffic [4, 5, 6] while 
interdiction resources such as unmanned surface vessels 
(USV) are used to conduct ship inspection and 
anchorage protection [7, 8, 9]. It is cognitively 
challenging for the command and control (C2) officers 
to track the intentions of each ship and to plan for 
maritime interdiction operations. The decision maker’s 
ability to think is affected by confusion, senses 
overwhelmed, and debilitation [10]. The quality of the 
decision is also affected by cognitive tunnel vision in 
which attention is distracted due to cognitive overload. 
Henceforth, a decision-support system (DSS) based on 
the human decision-making process is desirable to 
support the decision-maker in the tactical operation.  
The DSS is also useful in simulation systems. Many 
Simulation Systems for Stability and Support operation 
model the interdiction resources using scripted profiles 
such as the one used in NPS SEA Integrated Project for 
Port Security Strategy 2012 [11]. A Scripted profile 
does not correctly represent the decision-maker’s plan 
for maritime interdiction. Henceforth, a decision-
making model is desirable to manage the behavioral 
profiles of patrol resources for maritime interdiction.  
 
This paper is organized into eight sections. Section 2 
describes the theories used in the development of the 
decision-making model. Section 3 describes the 
previous works done. Section 4 describes the 
application of the theories. Section 5 describes the 
verification and validation processes. Section 6 
describes an experiment conducted to evaluate the 
performance of the software model. Section 7 describes 
the conclusion and section 8 describes some 
recommendations, and possible future work. 
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2. Theories  
 
2.1 Motivation and Overview 
 
Boyd [12] wrote that in order to make a sound decision, 
there is a need for insight and vision, “to unveil 
adversary plans and actions, as well as foresees own 
goals and appropriate plans and actions”. Henceforth, 
the decision-making model can be organized into two 
parts: enemy course-of-action (ECA) inference, and 
own forces course-of-action (OCA) development. The 
first part is to determine possible ECAs for all 
shipping-contacts from the composite situational 
display in a Command and Control System. After 
which, all shipping-contacts can then be prioritized 
according to their inferred attributes such as ECA-
probability and time criticality. The second part is to 
deploy own forces in order to maximize effectiveness.  
 
The decision-making model uses conceptual blending 
theory (CBT) [13] to model Boyd’s OODA mental 
process [12] to develop ECAs and OCAs for maritime 
interdiction. The CBT is implemented using the first 
generation NPS CMAS Library [14]. The threat 
assessment model is based on the Surface Warfare 
Threat Assessment strategy [15]. Probability estimate 
of event (PEoE) [10] is used to indicate the significant 
of an ECA. A combination of several PEoE for several 
ECAs of the same shipping-contact is used to represent 
the mental picture of a decision-maker on a tactical 
situation, which is similar to the process of inductive 
reasoning [16]. The linear assignment uses Munkras 
algorithm [17] to optimally assign interdiction 
resources to suspicious shipping-contacts. Simkit [18] 
is used to provide a simulated composite situational 
picture for the decision-making process.  
 
2.1 Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) 
 
Conceptual Blending Theory [13] suggests how 
humans process and rationalize information through a 
set of mental operations. The theory explains the 
process of assigning meanings to incoming information 
from sensory input, integrating them, and eventually 
learning and gaining knowledge. Conceptual blending 
is a set of operations for integrating mental spaces to 
form new mental spaces. Blending has been proposed 
as a fundamental high-speed background process in the 
brain (of which we are normally unaware) that 
combines knowledge from perception and experience 
to construct meaning and new knowledge. Mental 
spaces are small conceptual packets interconnected in 
working memory, and are constructed continuously and 
seemingly without effort by the brain. Within the 
mental spaces are elements of knowledge that are 
structured by long term schematic frames called 
organizing frames, which shape or govern the elements 
in the mental spaces. Mental spaces are modified as 
thoughts and discourses unfold; they appear to set the 
stage for our conscious mental activity. An example of 
the simple integration network is described in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.  A simple integration network. (Extracted from ref 
[25]) 
2.2 Software Blending 
 
Professor Hiles [14, 19] has demonstrated software 
blending in Project IAGO using multi-agent 
coordination techniques motivated by the properties of 
biological cells. The software blending is implemented 
using three key bio-inspired operators called 
Membrane, Connector and Ticket (Figure 2). The 
membrane is the common environment in which all 
related mental spaces such as generic spaces, input 
spaces and blended spaces exist. Connectors, which 
resemble the receptor mechanisms that support 
signaling and communications in biological cells [20], 
are used to connect one space to another. Tickets 
contain the procedural information that describes how 
knowledge elements will be processed upon 
establishment of connection among the connectors. 
Each ticket contains several frames with each frame 
having individual receptor either extended or retracted. 
The sequence of operations of corresponding tickets 
will be executed when two connectors match. The 
connections formed are persistence and scale free, 
which can then be used to build the blending network.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Membrane, Connector and Ticket  
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2.3 Boyd’s OODA Loop Theory 
 
Boyd’s OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action) loop is a theory of knowledge formation [12]. 
The OODA loop describes how humans construct 
mental models of their environment through immediate 
observation and orientation, which is under the 
influence of experience, culture, history, genetics, etc. 
These mental models are then used to decide on course-
of-action. The outcomes of the decision are known 
through subsequent observation. Observation is the 
information collection about the enemy and the 
environment. Orientation is the analysis of the 
information collected. Decision is the selection of 
course-of-action from the alternatives. Action is the 
implementation of the course-of-action selected.  
 
2.4 Threat Assessment 
 
Liebhaber and Feher [15] have investigated the threat 
assessment process used by experienced surface 
warfare personnel. Data were collected from 
experienced watch standers and used to develop a 
surface threat assessment algorithm as part of a 
decision support system (DSS). The DSS can be used 
to support the cognitive process of surface warfare 
personnel operating in highly complex, fast-paced 
littoral environments. The first part of the investigation 
is to categorize the various types of platform into five 
different threatening levels in littoral or open waters. 
After which, the following cues are used to either 
increase or decrease the likelihood of the threat: Speed, 
heading, Closest-Point-of-Approach, recent maneuvers, 
distance, cargo, number of vessels, sea lane, 
Electronics Intelligence, coordinated activity, voice 
communication, own support in area, destination, 
weapon envelope, regional intelligence. In this paper, 
the same threat assessment strategy is used to derive a 
probability estimate associated with each ECA.  
 
2.5 Bounded Rationality & Inductive Reasoning 
 
Arthur [16] suggested that human beings are not good 
at deductive logic but rather good in pattern recognition 
and inductive reasoning: during the reasoning process, 
several hypotheses will be formed and will either be 
strengthened, weaken or even replaced, accordingly to 
input arriving from the environment. In the course of 
planning process, human beings will attempt to conduct 
situational reasoning. The reasoning process is usually 
based on bounded rationality because decisions are 
usually made with incomplete and conflicting 
information. This is in line with Tversky and 
Kahneman study that human being does not usually 
make rational choice but can easily be biased based on 
experience or personal preference [21]. Simon [22] 
suggested that decision-making is further complicated 
by psychological processes. Arthur [16] proposed that 
inductive reasoning approach enables the human beings 
to deal with complication and ill-defined problem 
space.  
 
Based on these propositions, several ECA hypotheses 
can be created for one shipping-contact. These 
hypotheses will either be strengthened or weakened, 
according to arriving cues from the external 
environment. Each cue can be interpreted 
independently and accordingly to human experience by 
assigning different weight by which the attack 
probability (PEoE) is increased or decreased. Each 
PEoE will be updated autonomously. Each shipping 
contact will have one PEoE for each possible ECA. A 
group of PEoE for a single shipping-contact forms a 
pattern that resembles the mental picture of a human 
expert. The pattern of related PEoE dynamically 
models the human inductive reasoning process, even 
under rapidly changing and novel conditions.   
 
3. Related Works 
 
Scientists at Ohio State University performed a course-
of-action simulation analysis for the U.S. Army [23]. 
They used modeling and simulation (M&S) 
technologies to assist in the planning and decision-
making chain with COA development and COA 
effectiveness predictions. Genetic algorithms were used 
to create a large number of COA permutations from 
subject-matter-expert-defined initial conditions and 
constraints. The large set of course-of-actions is then 
reduced to a set of pareto-optimal course-of-actions 
containing unique COA characteristics. One 
fundamental difference between the CBT approach and 
the genetic algorithm (GA) approach is that, the use of 
conceptual blending theory and software blending 
mechanism allow fast parallel evolution of the solution 
space. The experiment and results described in section 
6 show that the CBT approach can generate correct and 
optimal solution within a short time.  
 
Sokolowski [24] has developed the RPDA agent based 
on Klein’s recognition-primed decision (RPD) making 
concept to model a military decision-maker at the 
operational level of warfare. The RPD model also 
emphasizes on the ability to recognize a particular 
decision situation and to identify an appropriate action 
based on past experiences.  Sokolowski uses the frame 
data structure that corresponds to a single experience 
that holds the cues, goals, and actions that describe that 
experience. In each decision situation, the RPDAgent 
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searches its table of frames to look for a match. If a 
match is found, the matching frame, together with its 
associated cues, goals, and actions will be retrieved. 
Otherwise, the model will ignore the situation. The 
objective is to find a decision of actions that will satisfy 
the goals through a process of negotiation and mental 
simulation.  In the CBT approach, we use several 
PEoE, generated through inductive reasoning process 
to represent the mental picture for a situation. In this 
case, there will always be a mental picture formed even 
for a novel situation. We have tested in a separate 
experiment that our decision-making model is able to 
generate a good solution even for a shipping-contact 
that provide a novel set of sensory cues that is beyond 
the experience of an expert.  
 
Ozkan [25] implemented a threat assessment model, 
using a multi-agent system and conceptual blending 
theory, to mimic how a human expert assesses the 
intention of an incoming air threat. The thesis shows 
that a multi-agent system and conceptual blending 
theory can be used to introduce cognitive intelligence 
into a computational model. In another thesis, Tan [26] 
also implemented threat assessment using CBT for 
surface warfare based on cues to establish various 
forms of violations. The violations are used to 
determine each track’s intention through a weighting 
strategy in terms of “friendly,” “neutral,” “potentially 
hostile,” or “unknown.” This paper extends the work of 
Ozkan and Tan by using CBT and software blending 
mechanism to generate ECA and OCA.  
 
4. Modeling Approach 
 
The modeling methodology begins with defining the 
mental process in which the decision maker undertakes 
during the decision-making process. The mental 
process is jointly defined with several experienced 
naval warfare officers in Naval Postgraduate School. 
After which, the conceptual blending network will be 
designed based on the mental process.  
 
4.1 Mental Process 
 
The mental process of observing the composite 
situational display, deriving ECA hypothesis, 
evaluating and selecting OCA can be explained based 
on Boyd’s OODA loop theory [12]. During 
Observation, the operator observes all shipping 
contacts, high value units (HVU) and interdiction 
resources displayed on the situational display. The 
display can be a fusion of radar plot with other sensory 
sources such as Automatic Shipboard Identification 
System, Electronics Intelligence, and other spot reports. 
Essentially, information types available for further 
processing are kinematics, descriptive, intelligence and 
imagery information.   
 
During Orientation, the operator uses information 
observed to infer hypotheses for all shipping-contacts. 
In order to identify hostile intention, several shipping-
contact ECA hypotheses can be derived for each 
contact against each possible HVU with different ECA 
probability. The probability of each ECA is increased 
or decreased based on Surface Warfare Threat 
Assessment strategy [15].  The likely situation, which is 
represented by the contact’s ECA probability, can be 
“recognized” through the interpretation of the cues in 
the same way an expert interprets the cues to recognize 
a particular situation. This is similar to the recognition 
approach proposed by Klein [27]. However, instead of 
serial recognition approach, multiple agents are used to 
process multiple serial recognitions in parallel to 
improve efficiency and to reduce the complexity 
involved in the second variability in RPD model [27].  
Klein explained that serial approach with “satisficing” 
is more efficient, while a comparative approach would 
be more difficult although it is desirable as described in 
classical decision theory [28]. In this experiment, 
multiple agents can be introduced to process multiple 
serial-recognition in parallel for eventual comparison.  
This approach proved to be highly efficient (see 
Section 6). 
 
The possible attack tactics are derived base on the 
findings of Rohan [29, 30], Raymond [2, 31] and 
Bateman et al [3]. Six attack tactics have been 
identified: (1) Suicide bombing; (2) Short Range 
Weapon Attack; (3) Boarding; (4) Suicide Attack using 
ship with huge mass and high inertial energy; (5) 
Suicide Attack using Ship with flammable cargo; and 
(6) Missile attack. Neutral Intention is added to account 
for neutral course-of-action.  
 
Mental simulation is then conducted for each attack 
hypothesis to simulate into the future to compute 
counterfactual information about the attack such as 
possible collision time and space (counterfactual 
mental spaces play an important role in planning 
possible outcomes [13]). After the hypotheses have 
been established, the inferred ECA of the ship can be 
selected based on the hypothesis that carries the highest 
probability. The computed ECA probability becomes 
an attribute of the contact as well as the vulnerability 
attribute of the HVU through back projection [13]. The 
contact can now be prioritized according to ECA 
probability or time criticality. 
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During Decision, many OCA are generated, one for 
each interdiction resource-contact pair. An 
effectiveness value for each OCA will be determined. 
After which, a linear assignment can be applied to 
select the optimal set of OCA by using ECA probability 
as priority and effectiveness as the cost. After the 
assignment process, the OCA selected is evaluated 
against the goals derived based on hypothesized ECA. 
If any of the goals cannot be fulfilled even for an 
optimal solution, an external agency such as a 
helicopter can be deployed.  
 
During Action, the OCAs selected are executed. The 
operator continue to monitor the situation and to amend 
the plan if situation changes. The changes to the plan 
can be done by repeating the OODA mental process 
again. 
 
4.2. Conceptual Blending Network 
 
In observation, one input space is created for each 
shipping-contact, HVU and interdiction resource to 
monitor their states in the real world.  Each input space 
is created as Data Ticket in the software blending 
library.  An example of a data ticket for HVU Input 
Space is described in Figure 3. The elements of 
knowledge are data that are translated from the real 
world. The lines with different shapes are connectors 
that can be extended or retracted in the membrane, 
depending on the availability of the data.  
  
 
Figure 3.  Data Ticket for HVU Input Mental Space. The 
labels represent elements of knowledge while the lines 
extending from the elements represent connectors for the 
elements.  
Contact ECA deduction is carried out through the 
blending network as shown in Figure 4. It is done 
through the process of composition, completion and 
elaboration, which are the three conceptual blending 
processes [13]. During the composition process, the 
orientation generic space blends the shipping-contact 
input Space with HVU input space and Tactic input 
space to create seven unique ECA hypothesis blended 
spaces for each contact-HUV pair. The contact, HVU 
and attack tactics are connected through the vital link of 
predator-prey relationship. Each hypothesis blend 
represents one possible shipping-contact ECA that 
reads:  
Contact c Attack HVU h using Tactic t.  
 
The process of completion is carried out using 
Liebhaber and Feher [15] surface warfare threat 
assessment approach. The baseline of each ECA 
probability is first set to 0.5, representing that a new 
ECA has similar chance of being valid or invalid. After 
which, each ECA hypothesis blended space computes 
its probability value autonomously based on incoming 
cues available in the shipping-contact input space. The 
process of elaboration is carried out by projecting the 
completed blends into the future to deduce 
counterfactual information such as time of collision. 
The time of collision determines the time criticality of 
this threat. After the blending process is completed, the 
contact ECA with the highest probability will be chosen 
as the most probable ECA. The ECA probability, time-
to-react as well as the possible target are then back-
projected to the shipping-contact input space and 
become part of the shipping-contact input space 
attributes for use in the subsequent blending process. 
Similarly, the ECA probability will be back-projected 
to the HVU input space to serve as the HVU 
vulnerability attribute. The shipping-contacts can now 









Figure 4.  Blending Network for ECA Analysis in 
Orientation. The yellow node is the generic space that guides 
the selective projection from the 3 input spaces (grey nodes) 
through predator-prey vital relationship. The 3 green nodes 
refer to the same blended space through the 3 processes of 
composition, completion and elaboration. The Counterfactual 
informations are back-projected into the shipping-contact and 
HVU input spaces.  
The OCA mental process can be further organized into 
three sub processes: Goal Generation, OCA generation 
and OCA selection. After a shipping-contact ECA has 
been derived, the human operator will determine the 
Goal for each shipping-contact ECA. The blending 
network for Goal Generation is shown in Figure 5. 
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During composition, the generic space guides the 
selective projection of elements (sensed state) from the 
shipping-contact input space and goal input space (goal 
type) and connects the spaces through cause-effect vital 
link to form the new goal blended space. The goal is 
determined based on the sensed-state of the shipping-
contact. The sensed-state is either determined through 
real-world information or deduced through the inferred 
ECA probability from the previous blending process. If 
the sensed state is “unknown”, an “Investigation” Goal 
will be assigned with the intention to collect more 
information on this shipping-contact. If the sensed state 
is “possible-hostile”, a “Boarding” Goal will be 
assigned with the intention to board the possible ship 
with personnel for hostility confirmation. If the sensed 
state is “hostile”, a “Destroy” Goal will be assigned 
with the intention to either stop the ship with a weapon 
or through boarding operation. The completion process 
derives the time required for the Goal to be fulfilled 
using the “time of collision” counterfactual information 
derived in the previous blending process. Note that 
there is no elaboration process. After the blending 
process has completed, the blended goal is back-
projected into the shipping-contact Input Space.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Figure 3 Blending Network for Goal Development 
in Orientation.  
After the Goals have been derived, the next mental 
process is to derive all possible OCA. In this context, 
one OCA means the assignment of one interdiction 
resource to one shipping-contact. If there are m 
contacts and n resources, there will be n x m possible 
OCAs. The blending network for generating OCA is 
given in Figure 6. The composition process generates 
an OCA blend for each interdiction resource and 
shipping-contact pair. The completion process 
determines if there has been a match in Goal 
requirement and capability available. For example, if 
the goal is to stop the ship through boarding operation, 
an unmanned surface vessel that carries no human-
being on board can never fulfill the goal. The 
elaboration process then computes the time required for 
the interdiction resource to reach the contact, which 
forms the effectiveness value. If the mental simulation 
concluded that the interdiction-resource is unable to 
reach the shipping-contact before it reaches its target, 
the ineffective flag will be set. 
 
The decision on the OCA is carried out through a linear 
assignment process using Munkras’ algorithm [17] with 
the effectiveness as the cost. The Contact Input Spaces 
are sorted according to ECA probability (not including 
neutral ECA). After which, n number of the highest 
ECA probability contact are selected for the assignment 
process while n is the number of available interdiction 
resources. After which, the initial list of possible OCA 
is reduced by culling the OCA that are not in the top 
priority list. The effectiveness in the reduced OCA list 
is formulated into the cost matrix as input to Munkras’ 
algorithm. After the assignment process, if none of the 
interdiction resource is able to reach a particular 
shipping-contact in time before it reaches its 
hypothesized target, an emergency flag will be raised. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Blending Network for OCA generation 
After the assignment process, the OCAs are 
disseminated out to the interdiction resources for 
execution. The OODA mental process is repeated 
immediately in order to allow continual assessment and 
dynamic reassignment should a higher priority threat 
appear. 
 
5. Verification and Validation 
 
The verification and validation (VV) strategy is based 
on the recommendations provided by Sargent [32]. The 
maritime scenario (Figure 7) used in the VV and 
experiment contains five HVUs (Grey Square icon), 
two patrol crafts (Blue Square icon), four unmanned 
surface patrol vessels (Cyan Square icon), and about 
200 neutral ships (yellow Circle icon). Terrorist ships 
(Yellow Square icon) are launched either from sea 




Figure 7.  Scenario for Model Testing 
The threat assessment experiences were compiled from 
a group of Naval Surface Warfare Officers in Naval 
Postgraduate School through a survey to understand 
how they conduct threat assessment based on a set of 
cues. Experts may process cues differently. The 
differences were de-conflicted by taking the median. It 
is also discovered that experts do not evaluate cue in 
isolation. Henceforth, certain cues are evaluated 
together as a singular state. For example, the speed of a 
boat is usually evaluated in conjunction with closest 
point of approach (CPA) to determine its threat level.   
After the experience coding process, the results were 
presented to them for calibration. The mental spaces 
are displayed in the form of tables to provide a visual 
display of mental spaces. Example of HVU Mental 
Space, Hypothesis Blended Space and OCA Blended 
Space are shown in Figure 8, 9 and 10 respectively.  
 
 
Figure 8.  HVU Mental Space 
 
Figure 9.  ECA Hypothesis Blended Space 
 
Figure 10.  OCA Blended Space 
The scenario was run with the adaptive display shown 
in Figure 11. The darker green color icons symbolize 
inferred neutral while the maroon color represents 
inferred possible hostile. The mental patterns of all 
possible ECA were presented to the expert. An example 
of the patterns that resembles that of a suicide bombing 
attack and Boarding attack are shown in Figure 12 and 
13 respectively. The probabilities of ECAs do not add 
up to one because they are derived independently. The 
mental pattern describes that although a set of sensory 
cues may point to a high chance of suicide bombing, 
the possibility of short range weapon and boarding 
attack also exist based on similar attributes such as 
small and fast boat. The interviewees agreed that the 
PEoE Pattern describes a possible mean to represent an 




Figure 11.  Situational Awareness Display 
 
Figure 12.  Suicide Bombing Mental Pattern. (Y axis is 
Probability) 
 
Figure 13.  Boarding Attack Mental Pattern. (Y axis is 
Probability) 
Computerized model verification was carried out by 
verifying the mental spaces through the visual display. 
Operational and Data validity was carried out through a 
survey conducted. Some of the techniques used in the 
VV processes were animation, Degenerate Tests, 
Extreme Condition Tests, Face Validity, Fixed Values, 
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Internal Validity, and Turing Tests. The survey results 
(Table 1) have been positive. Most of the interviewees 
indicated that the decision-making process resembles 
the way they make decisions in the littoral surface 
warfare. Most interviewees agreed that such a model 
will be beneficial as a decision support tool. 
 
Do you use observation-orientation-
decision-action loop theory as your 
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An experiment was designed to test the performance of 
the model based on comparison of the performance 
with and without the model as well as computation 
time. The scenario described in Figure 7 was run in 
either scripted mode or in decision-making mode. The 
measures of performance were: 
(a) Percentage of neutral shipping investigated 
(b) Percentage of terrorist neutralized.  
 
In each run, ten terrorists were launched either from 
southern islands, eastern or western side of the 
Singapore Strait with the attempt to saturate the 
maritime interdiction process. The performances for 
with and without using the decision-making model are 
given in Figure 14. The planned profile was able to 
neutralize most of the terrorists while the scripted 
profile was only able to neutralize around 60% of the 
terrorists by chance. The planned profile investigated 
lesser neutral ships because more emphasis were being 
placed on high priority threats, which resulted in 
investigating ships that were usually further apart that 
required more travelling time. The lesser number of 
neutral ships being investigated may not imply lower 
performance, but rather imply a higher efficiency 
without unnecessary investigation and yet still able to 
achieve a higher terrorist interception rate.   
 

























Figure 14.  Comparison of Planned profile and Scripted Profile 
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Figure 15.  Computation Time 
The computational times required to compute the ECA 
and to make a decision on OCA as a function of 
number of shipping-contact are given in Figure 15. The 
timings collected were based on running the software 
on a Dell Inspiron Notebook computer with 1.67 MHz 
CPU and 1GB RAM. The time requirement increases 
almost linearly with the increase of the number of 
shipping-contact. This is a remarkable performance 
because an addition of one ship will add 69 mental 
spaces into the systems. With extrapolation, the time 
required to compute one plan for one thousand ships in 
Singapore Strait may take under 2 minutes. Since 
60000 ships transit through Singapore Strait yearly [1], 
the ship time of arrival is approximately 8 minutes. As 
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can be seen, the running of the plan for every arrival of 
each ship is feasible even on a low end notebook 
computer. Therefore, the decision-making software 
based on CBT and software blending mechanism is 





This model demonstrated that it is possible to model 
Boyd’s OODA mental process using CBT to develop 
OCA for maritime interdiction resources. The CBT 
have been implemented using the first generation NPS 
CMAS Library to model the human expert in the 
process of shipping-contact ECA identification.  The 
threat assessment model has been developed based on a 
modified Liebhaber and Feher’s Surface Warfare 
Threat Assessment Model because experts interviewed 
in this study do not process cues in isolation. It has 
been shown that the threat assessment model resembles 
the process of a human operator conducting surface 
threat assessment. It has also been observed that a 
group of PEoE can be used to model the human mental 
pattern in the threat evaluation process. Individual 
PEoE that autonomously process incoming cues locally 
can produce a global effect that represents the mental 
pattern of a threat reasoning process. The 
experimentation has demonstrated that a group of 
interdiction resources can be better managed with this 
Model and can allow the interception of terrorist with 
high success rate without having the need to inspect 
more ships. The experimentation has also shown that a 
huge amount of contact ECA and OCA can be 
generated and evaluated through the CBT process in a 
timely manner even on a commodity computer.  
 
8. Recommendations and Future Work 
 
Although this concept demonstrator achieved some 
success in the application of several cross-disciplinary 
theories in the maritime domain, the factors of 
consideration are by no means comprehensive if this 
system is going to be deployed in the real world 
environment. A more detailed study based on available 
cues and classification of cues should be conducted. In 
addition, the process of goals generation and decisions 
can be further improved by considering logistical 
factors, area of coverage influence and environmental 
condition. In addition, the contact ECA analysis can be 
improved with mental simulation using intelligence 
agents to represent terrorists’ behavior as a function of 
interdiction resources positioning, environmental and 
traffic condition before launching an operation. 
Another enhancement may include learning-agents to 
manage the interpretation of the cues in the threat 
assessment instead of simple application of expert’s 
knowledge. After a prediction, each ECA agent can 
compare its prediction with the actual results after 
positive identification so that adjustment can be made 
to improve the cue interpretation process. This will 
allow the system to accumulate its own experiences in 
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